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Post-Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs) have become larger, more mobile, multi-faceted and
conducted over vast areas of remote, rugged, and harsh geography. They have been increasingly involved in
dangerous areas with ill-defined boundaries, simmering internecine armed conflict, and disregard on the part of
some local parties for peacekeepers’ security and role. Yet progressively there have been expectations of financial
restraint and austerity. Additionally, UN PKOs have become more “robust,” that is, engaged in preemptive, assertive
operations. A statistically positive and significant relationship exists between missions’ size, complexity, remoteness,
and aggressive tenor and a higher probability of trauma or death, especially as a result of hostile actions or disease.
Therefore, in the interest of “force protection” and optimizing operations, a key component of UN PKOs is health
care and medical treatment. The expectation is that UN PKO medical support must conform to the general intent
and structure of current UN PKOs to become more streamlined, portable, mobile, compartmentalized, and specialized,
but also more varied and complex to address the medical aspects of these missions cost-efficiently. This article
contends that establishing a hybrid level 2—a level 2 with level 3 modules and components (i.e., level 2+)—is a viable
course of action when considering trends in the medical aspects of Post-Cold War UN PKOs. A level 2 medical
treatment facility has the potential to provide needed forward mobile medical treatment, especially trauma care, for
extended, complex, large-scale, and comprehensive UN PKOs. This is particularly the case for missions that include
humanitarian outreach, preventive medicine, and psychiatry. The level 2 treatment facility is flexible enough to expand
into a hybrid level 2+ with augmentation of modules based on changes in mission requirements and variation in
medical aspects.
Keywords: Post-cold war, United Nations, Peacekeeping operations, Peacekeepers, Military medical care,
Military medical treatment, Tiers, Echelons, LevelsIntroduction
An essential element of United Nation’s peacekeeping
operations (UN PKOs) is provision of health services in
support of mission personnel in areas of operations [1].
The overall objective of medical support is the physical
and mental well-being of deployed personnel, conserva-
tion of human resources, preservation of life, and limita-
tion of residual physical and mental disabilities. A nascent
understanding suggests that quality health service means
that “planning, coordination, execution, monitoring, and
professional supervision impacts the health and well-beingCorrespondence: ralph.j.johnson16.mil@mail.mil
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ful execution” [2]. Arguably, peacekeepers operate better
when they are healthy and know that high-quality medical
treatment is available in case of injury or illness. Neverthe-
less, UN PKOs are becoming increasingly mobile over
wide swaths of rugged/remote geographic areas to meet
extensive and varied multi-dimensional mandates—all
while facing considerable financial constraints [3–5]. Also,
UN PKOs are operating in hostile environments with
poorly defined boundaries, continued armed conflict, and
scant assurance of respect for their safety.
To manage and treat sizable numbers of casualties,
military medicine, including UN PKOs, uses a planning
technique involving echelons (“levels”) of care to reducee distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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proportions [6, 7]. Levels of care represent a framework
for rational, practical, and efficient deployment of med-
ical resources in support of missions. This framework
developed from the premise that casualties occur in
places remote from care facilities and these patients
must be treated and sheltered at staging points before
evacuation. Thus, a medical event or condition is ad-
dressed at a level of care that offers the necessary
sophistication in skills and complexity in technology and
materials. If it cannot be addressed at one level, the
patient is moved to a higher level. Thus, a system was
instituted for progressive care and five echelons of care
were recognized (basic plus levels 1–4). The effective-
ness of treatment is enhanced by a division of labor and
standardized treatment at each echelon. Minor casualties
are preempted early so that serious casualties can receive
better treatment. A nagging problem with the system
has been a lack of suitable facilities to treat emergencies
in forward areas of operations. Casualties are trans-
ported long distances with consequent risk. The Medical
Support Manual for United Nations Peacekeeping Opera-
tions (2nd ed.) notes that “levels of medical support have
been standardized to ensure the highest standards of
peacekeeping medical care come from different countries
with varying standards … medical support plans must be
designed to meet specific operations demands” [1].
In this system, the level 2 mobile medical hospital,
though mobile, portable, and flexible, is the consequence
of deploying a tiered system that evolved from experi-
ence in sustaining sizable pre-Cold War UN PKOs that
were relatively fixed/static and linear. However, reliance
on level 2 mobile facilities is also the consequence of a
tiered system with increasing complexity that also can
rely on the level 3 fixed-facility hospital (or transport
out-of-country to such a facility) for extensive diag-
nostics, trauma surgery, specialist care, and long-term
medical care capabilities [8, 9]. In some cases, level 3
facilities have not been deployed and their medical cap-
abilities have rarely been deployed fully. Such care has
been obtained from an existing civilian hospital in or
near the area of operations or a military hospital in a
neighboring stable nation [1].
Previously, UN PKO components had their own basic,
level 1, and level 2 medical personnel. Nevertheless, UN
PKO missions have attempted to provide a standalone,
central level 2 mobile hospital from a troop-contributing
nation. These facilities, while relatively fixed/static, can
provide mobile care in dynamic operations [10]. How-
ever, as the complexity of operations has increased, the
need to fix quarters and provide more sophisticated
medical capabilities has also increased, thus decreasing
mobility. It has always been difficult to balance capabil-
ities and mobility. Smaller mobile medical facilities stillneed some assets and personnel assigned to larger fixed
facilities and remote hospitals despite sacrificing some
mobility. That is, to offset any reduction in mobility, the
most mobile and mission-essential assets from level 3
augment level 2 and even level 1 [11].
That said, the level 2 mobile hospital remains the
standard, mainstay, workhorse, and lynchpin for relatively
large-scale UN PKOs in various theaters. The result is
lower levels of medical care relying heavily on non-
organic transportation personnel to ensure movement and
through-put so that care arrives where needed and need is
transported to where care can be provided [12, 13]. Move-
ment, in particular patient transport, always incurs risks.
Furthermore, UN PKOs are increasingly involved in re-
mote “failed states” [14]. The local in-country hospitals
that could have been used for level 3 care—and even re-
mote military hospitals in neighboring so-called stable na-
tions—are compromised. Their use for UN personnel is
not feasible in that “they are poorly equipped and incap-
able of providing many basic services, medical emergent
stabilization services are limited, blood supplies are un-
available, tainted, and even non-existent, and medicines, if
even available, are expired, and there is poor sanitation
and hygiene” [15]. This situation leads to even lengthier
and more expensive transports for relatively routine med-
ical procedures as well as catastrophic emergencies need-
ing higher than level 2 care. This then overburdens the
transport system; it also affects peacekeeper downtime
when peacekeepers cannot return to duty quickly after
routine procedures.
The situation is even further complicated because UN
PKO personnel operate in environments marked by poor
sanitation, as well as water- and food-borne vectors and
illnesses, and are at high risk for infectious and debilitat-
ing diseases [16–20]. Thus, preventive medicine—a level
3 commodity—is absolutely necessary in remote areas of
operation (at level 2 or 1) to advance force protection
and civil-military cooperation.
The hope is that UN PKOs will become streamlined,
faster, more efficient, and more capable so as to be in-
volved in more wide-ranging, multi-faceted operations
conducted over large, diverse, and remote geographic
areas. Simply put, “there are hopes to structure slow and
cumbersome processes to quickly respond to emergent
crises” (cf. [21]). Consequently, medical support is also
likely to conform to the larger structure of the UN PKO.
Medical support will become smaller, more portable and
mobile, more compartmentalized, and more specialized
(i.e., modular) to establish itself more quickly in areas of
operations. Also, in response to harsh and unforgiving
environments, UN PKOs may need to become more
self-sufficient and insular (cf. [22]).
Therefore, through a review of open sourced research
and doctrine, this article contends that a hybrid level 2
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vices and modules is the most promising option when
accounting for post-Cold War trends in the medical
aspects of UN PKOs. Risk and trauma have been escalat-
ing rapidly, whereas the response has come too late. It is
hoped that this report will enable planners and policy-
makers in more quickly enhancing medical support to
UN PKOs and better ensure the health and well-being of
UN PKO members, which has increasingly included
among the world’s militaries. Better health and well-being
of UN PKO members is the ideal in medical support en-
sconced in the UN’s medical mission statement.
Review
Medical aspects
Johnson [23–25] reported on the medical aspects of post-
Cold War UN PKO missions, summarized as follows.
(1). UN PKOs are expanded and more robust in
post-Cold War affairs. They have been and can
expect to (1) be conducted in the world’s rugged,
inhospitable, and inherently dangerous peripheries,
primarily on the margins of the Third and Fourth
Worlds, (2) involve less benign handovers from
unfinished security missions, (3) have questionable
consent by belligerents to the peace process and
simmering conflicts ready to boil, and (4) draw
peacekeepers into hostile action or becoming
victims of remote explosive devices.
(2). The medical events that UN PKO medical support
staff encounters, therefore, will increasingly
resemble combat trauma and include exotic
and debilitating illnesses.
(3). Thus, the conundrum that medical commands
face is whether to (1) move medical treatment to
patients in the forward area of operations and risk
their medical personnel, (2) move patients back to
medical treatment with risk to the patients, or
(3) strike a practical compromise in between.
(4). Additionally, the peripheries in which post-Cold
War UN PKOs operate have their own locally
endemic exotic diseases, other inhospitable and
risky features, and wicked flora and fauna. These all
pose risks to UN peacekeepers, including medical
personnel. This demands preventive medical
measures throughout the area of operations. Also,
one thing is certain, civil conflict and its ancillary
human tragedies are not good for the human
psyche. Thus, psychiatric medicine is needed.
(5). Furthermore, the demand for civil/military-driven
humanitarian medical outreach far into the margins
of already risky and dangerous situations adds a
new and dangerous dimension to UN PKO
missions and their medical components.(6). This creates a need for generalist/family practice
medical professionals and medical sub-specialties,
particularly surgical sub-specialties. As civilians—in
particular, women and children—are caught in the
middle of all this, there will be more emphasis on
women’s and family health issues. So there is an
expanded need for women health professionals and
family practitioners, in particular in cultures that
prohibit cross-gender contact.
(7). In addition, as expanded post-Cold War UN PKO
missions grind on, attrition in medical staffs will
require a reserve back-fill system. The downside is
that deployed augmentees are at higher risk for
psychological morbidities and may be less physically
fit for in-the-field austerities.
Need for a modified level 2 medical treatment facility
The literature on medical aspects of expanded and more
robust post-Cold War UN PKOs suggests the need for
field medical treatment support capable of moving itself,
while retaining the ability to deliver varied medical care
at different levels. This must be accomplished to provide
medical treatment in far forward areas of operations,
especially trauma care, which sustains (1) extended and
comprehensive operations, (2) maneuvers, and (3) hu-
manitarian outreach. A modified UN PKO level 2 facility
can provide the necessary bed capacity for trauma and
intermediate care for casualties resulting from hostile
action, injuries, and illness [1, 26]. This facility can be
variable enough to expand to include augmentation by
medical detachments in response to changing mission
requirements. Additionally, this component’s far forward
medical care should be upgraded consistent with U.S.
and British models with medics who are (1) assigned to
patient transport and other medical duties and (2)
trained and certified as emergency medical technicians
and paramedics or emergency practical nurses [9, 27].
For forward area units, designated squad-level military
personnel should be trained and certified as combat life
savers or in basic first aid. The objective is to enhance
and push medical/trauma care knowledge and skills
down to the forward areas of operations to improve re-
sponsiveness closer to medical emergencies.
Mobility is important as medical support must move
in tandem with forward area of operations peacekeepers.
The level 2 facility technically is mobile and provides
fundamental trauma care as a base on which modules
can be “plugged in for play” (i.e., modularity). Specific-
ally, this allows other specialty components to be added
or subtracted as needed to offer augmentation tailored
to the mission and its changing nature [28, 29]. Thus,
the next generation of medical care for UN PKOs can
have the flexibility to expand (or contract) to support
needed medical detachments, while retaining mobility
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including trauma care. Note, modularity has been used
and incorporated in US Armed Forces and NATO/UE
procedures and doctrine and it cannot be over-
emphasized that modularity of medical support is not a
new concept and has been developed by US Armed
Forces and NATO/UE to meet the challenges of their
missions that bear striking similarity to the challenges
UN PKOs have been increasingly facing in the Post-Cold
War [1, 30–34]. Rather, what is relatively innovative is
advocating modularity’s adoption, adaptation to and ex-
panded and practical use for medical support on UN
PKOs to overcome new challenges regarding the health
nuances of Post-Cold War UN PKOs. (Note: UN PKOs
have never been restricted from using modular medical
support either).
Level 2 facilities are in areas of operations where med-
ical personnel are best able to intervene medically to
alter what might otherwise be debilitating or fatal med-
ical outcomes [28, 29]. They also can be augmented with
health providers to care for common and endemic dis-
eases and psychological stressors encountered in opera-
tions [9]. Level 1 components are primarily designed to
treat life-threatening conditions and evacuate to level 2,
possibly even level 3 or out of the country [1]. Note that
under the changing conditions of UN PKO missions,
level 1 medical facilities are insufficient to provide the
level of care necessary to avoid out-of-country medical
evacuation and repatriation [5, 15]. Level 2 can provide
trauma care and basic medical treatment, as well as hold
patients who can return to duty, and surgical teams, pre-
ventive medicine teams, and psychiatric providers alone
or in combinations can be plugged into the level 2 facility
depending on operations, although maintaining them at a
level 3 facility is more traditional. Level 2 has no intensive
care, medical supply, or extensive formulary capability [1].
However, through augmentation, level 2 can provide lim-
ited specialty care and limited pharmacy, blood, medical
supply, and equipment capability. Level 2 also lacks effect-
ive operations planning, patient administration, and signal
support—components that only a level 3 facility provides.
It can also accommodate components to address humani-
tarian outreach and women’s healthcare.
An ad hoc/hybrid level 2 facility can provide care
comparable to a level 3 but cannot supplant the level 3
entirely. Future operations’ mission structures, such as
the post-Cold War expanded structures, will require
basic and level 1 / 2 augmented support and need to be
farther forward and nearer field units. Level 2 should ac-
quire medical care aspects of level 3 such as preventive
medicine and psychological care providers. A condensed
level 3 can then concentrate on medical command for
overall operations. Mission operations needs support
from a level 3 facility to provide administration andcoordination. Therefore, one level 3 facility—but a con-
densed level 3—should be assigned per mission at the
command level.
In future post-Cold War expanded UN PKOs, the level
2 facility should be modular with the ability to expand
with add-on level 3 components. This aligns with the
provision of medical treatment and specialized care
based on operations’ exigencies, hostilities, patients, ter-
rain, and civil-military concerns. To support such UN
PKOs, the unit must be tactical. Therefore, it must have
the maneuverability to rapidly travel over some distance
in tandem with peacekeepers.
The level 2 facility arguably is the center of gravity for
medical support for UN PKOs. In field operations, this
component of care provides seriously hurt and ill patients
with life-saving medical intervention. It is also where
patients are stabilized for evacuation out-of-operations
and even out-of-country. Thus, ground and air Medevac
capabilities with highly trained medical personnel for en-
route life support must still be emphasized. The UN PKO
medical literature regarding PKO medical aspects suggests
that future medical support should be able to move
quickly over large distances and provide comprehensive
coverage farther forward in tandem with mobile forward
area peacekeepers. Augmented level 2 facilities provide
the level of care to do this effectively. Recent operations
have demonstrated that the focus of level 2 can be trauma
care, followed by non-hostile injuries and then illness (if
augmented by preventive medicine teams) (cf. [9, 28, 29]).
Level 3 can continue to offer specialized surgical cap-
abilities. It can also have the command-staff and extensive
medical logistics and maintenance capabilities required
for sustained long-term care. Its drawback is that it lacks
modular flexibility. Therefore, given the expected direc-
tion of future UN PKOs, emphasis on medical support for
operations must be at the level 2 facility that also incorpo-
rates (1) preventive and psychological medicine, (2) port-
ability and mobility, (3) medical sustainment pushed as far
forward as possible, and (4) accommodation for expanded
specialized care responsive to operational contingencies
(e.g., humanitarian outreach and women’s healthcare).
This also permits modular expansion of bed capacity for
larger treatment, holding, and evacuation.
The mobile modular level 2+
In UN PKOs, personnel and material are available for
level 2+ as attachments and augmentation building
blocks for the current level 2. Level 2+ should have
trauma and medical clinic (general practice) services,
nursing services with psychiatric nursing resources (i.e.,
“dual hats”), expanded pharmacy, blood supply, and ex-
panded medical stock. Preventive medicine teams should
be attached—but dispatched and roving throughout the
theater—to address field sanitation issues, potable water
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injury reduction (cf. [16]).
The command structure should retain the rank-and-
staff structure of the level 2 facility with slight elevation
due to its add-ons from level 3. The level 2 facility
should retain the capability to expand and exceed nor-
mal bed and sub-specialty capability through modularity.
It should have a commander, deputy for clinical services,
director for nursing care, and administrative officer [1].
This facility should not be an amalgamation from differ-
ent troop-supplying nations. Rather, it should be a uni-
fied, cohesive entity from one troop-supplying nation,
capable of maintaining its own vehicles, generators, and
equipment and conducting basic medical maintenance.
Also, this unit must be able to communicate with field
units, aviation, and ground transportation and lower and
higher elements. Logically, clinical services should be
organized around trauma, resuscitation, and life-and-
limb and eyesight sustainment with the intent to support
continuous operations. There should be a provision for
general and orthopedic practice as well but not extensive
diagnostic capabilities, which can be maintained at level
3. At the level 2 facility, the need for trauma care is obvi-
ous, as is the need to treat most illnesses encountered in
operations. This includes emergency medical treatment.
Nursing services should include bed care and patient
specialists. Service and supply should allow the orga-
nization to increase in size threefold. That way, if the
level 2 cannot address a particular challenge, it can be
expanded modularly by adding on those capabilities. It
must be underscored that Post-Cold War US and
NATO/EU missions and operations clearly have shown
multi-nationality and sharing medical assets and ap-
propriate practitioners combined through modularity is
included in their doctrine and has contributed to the
outstanding, successful medical support on their mis-
sions [30–36].
To address personnel turnover, back-fill from individ-
ual augmentees (e.g., reservists and Home Guard) may
be necessary. The troop-contributing nation should
manage training and pre-deployment readiness. Detach-
ments should be from either the troop-supplying nation
of the level 2+ facility or modules representing one
troop-supplying nation [13]. This ensures the cohesion
that develops from training and working together over
time and avoids communication difficulties related to
multi-national amalgamations. These modules would be
capable of relatively rapid deployment. Expansion of
the level 2+ would also give level 2+ leaders oppor-
tunities to develop leadership skills, work on tactical
field problems, and meet operational challenges in the
field [9]. Additional non-unit equipment should be
available from the level 3 to the level 2+ depending on
mission needs.Detachments such as humanitarian medical aid could
be organized within the level 2+ and/or drawn on from
the level 3. This system can facilitate a modular push
forward. This would improve adaptability necessary for
future UN PKOs that might have different and more
particular requirements, for example: those with specific
“hinterland” family medicine humanitarian outreach mo-
bile clinics as described by Milosevic [37]; or, preventive
medicine “taskings” in the peripheries as described by
Hazra [16]. These modules would require fewer
personnel and less equipment and be interchangeable.
Ideally, several level 2 + s could be fielded in large-scale
missions and coordinated by the condensed but refocused
level 3 (see Fig. 1).
Supporting this shift in medical treatment facilities,
and furthering rapid deployment, will require pre-
positioning, depot, cache, tracking and management,
maintenance of equipment, and contracting and finance
specialists. As the Liberian (ECOWAS) mission reported,
every contingent, including medical units and treatment
facilities, must be insular and self-sufficient such that it
includes laundry, catering, accommodations, office, com-
munications, explosive ordinance disposal (EOD), and
observation [38]. This means they must be equipped to
support whatever type of medical care mission they en-
counter. This might require extra inventory or specialized
inventory for plug-in-and-play, depending on operational
requirements. This also would create a redundancy of ma-
terial that has proved useful in previous and prolonged
operations that resulted in the need for replacement and
maintenance of worn and broken equipment.
Conclusions
Predicting the future is precarious. Nevertheless, the
evidence-based work reported here suggests that a hybrid
level 2+ medical facility augmented with proper services
and modules is optimal and best-practices for ad-
dressing trends and medical aspects of future UN PKOs
(see Fig. 2).
Figure 2 basic and level 1 medical care is a critical
capability required for all UN PKOs. Level 2 is where
wounded, injured, or ill patients are collected, stabilized,
and treated prior to return to duty or evacuation. If past
experience predicts future experience, future UN PKOs’
medical support will be mobile across large distances
into dangerous, remote, and rugged areas. Medical care
will be close-in to facilitate rapid treatment and evacu-
ation from basic and level 1 facilities. In previous opera-
tions, it was unrealistic to rely on aero-evacuation
entirely, in particular with (1) constant disruption due to
inclement weather, (2) a lack of landing areas and night
vision devices, and (3) even hostile anti-aircraft fire. The
requirement will be a more complex and larger level 2
facility capable of moving closer to field operations. A
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Fig. 2 Possible Theater Level 2 + Medical Treatment Facility for PK Mission(s) with Modules for Attachment or “Plug-in-and-Play”
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Fig. 1 Possible Level 2 + Medical Treatment Facility PK Mission Configurations
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treatment facilities in areas where conflict resolution is
indeed robust. This is because the level 2 facility is a
potentially vulnerable, high-value target. Another con-
sideration is that additional modules will reduce mobility
even with more transportation components. Thus, the
level 2 must have more of its own transportation with
the inclusion of additional modules.
The recommendations discussed here have the potential
to provide medical care capable of supporting UN PKOs
with more mobile medical capabilities, but without the
footprint of a level 3 or the need for expensive out-of-
country facilities. The facility will have an appropriate size
to support ad hoc small contingency operations and
humanitarian outreach or special operations. The level 2+
should be an element of a troop-lending nation, train as a
unit, and deploy and function intact to avoid language
barriers and communication issues. [12, 13]. To interface
with other personnel/units on the mission who speak a
different language, interpreters may be needed. These
smaller hospitals will be more easily deployed and en-
hanced through modularity. Modularity is achievable by
implementing a system of detachments for requirements
and specialties. These can come from the level 2+’s troop-
lending nation or self-contained detachment modules
from other troop-lending nations. The point is that stan-
dards of care must be comparable and personnel must
train and work together in the modules. More import-
antly, this provides the mission commander with flexibility
in planning for particular and varied missions or in
responding to mission changes.
The lessons reported here convey the importance of
medical care to UN PKOs. They suggest courses of ac-
tion that include use of modular augmentation in the
level 2 medical care for UN PKOs. This system could
significantly enhance the provision of military medical
care on UN PKO missions in ways that are capabilities-
based and efficiently achieved with flexibility, mobility,
adaptability, and expediency to accommodate particular,
varied, and evolving UN PKOs. Given the direction of
post-Cold War UN PKO trends, the recommendations
in this report should be incorporated across the
spectrum of medical aspects of expanded, post-Cold
War-type missions. The operational component of the
level 2 hospital can be modularly augmented with de-
tachments and teams, which can be plugged in for play.
At its core, it will still provide needed trauma and
general practice care. The importance of the work re-
ported here is that it provides a general conceptual
approach to considerations of medical aspects across
the spectrum of UN PKO missions, specifically the
iterative identification of relevant medical and health
aspects to UN PKO missions and planning for med-
ical controls accordingly.In light of the changed in the nature of Post-Cold War
PKOs, the argument for a change in terms of policy revi-
sion and adoption for PKO medical support described
herein is a natural logical extension. The next logical
extension in terms of ‘what is to be done’ are steps to
marshal this along. The following are possible generic
steps, in a general sequential order but conducted itera-
tively, that at minimum can be aimed to mobilize policy
and opinion.
 Study the requirements/standards that need to
be in policy.
 Conduct and take into account a needs/risk
assessment.
 Align the policy with previous policy and discard or
revise un-useful policy with new policy.
 Involve others, especially stakeholders, in drafting of
policy for maximum buy-in and to catch things in
error or unworkable.
 Get the policy approval from the high-ranking
stakeholders.
 Train and manage expectations on the necessity and
benefit of the policy.
 Take care to modify and update continuously
as the policy is piloted, vetted and implemented
[2, 11, 39–45].
Also, there must be an assessment to the extent that
recommendations grab the attention of policy makers.
One lesson learned is that UN PKO medical support
planning is complex; it requires more than a simple fix
of additional mobility or closer proximity or the addition
of this or that facet or module. Therefore, medical sup-
port plans must be purpose built for each operation.
Plans (and planners) must be capable of speedy initial
reaction and sufficiently flexible to manage rapidly chan-
ging demands (cf. [2]). Thus, given the experience of
past UN PKOs, in addition to fundamental structural
modifications, future UN PKOs will need to adopt a
medical support planning mind-set that is informed by
continuously updated research and aims to achieve best
practices (cf. [12, 13]). The mind-set adopted for medical
planning must consider and seek to strike a delicate bal-
ance in the trinity of proximity to medical care, time
involved in transporting, and security given the nature
of UN PKOs. Medical capabilities must correspond to
the mission, strength, and composition of the force
they support and the assessed environmental hazards
they face.
Finally, the paucity of research on which to base an
evidence-based review of structural and procedural
modifications for UN PKOs and non-war military inter-
ventions literally cries for the need for more open-
sourced, peer-reviewed work in this arena. Not only does
Johnson Disaster and Military Medicine  (2015) 1:15 Page 8 of 8the peer-review process add credibility to findings and
patina to the finished product, but incorporation into
and citations in other research and critical response are
indicators of the extent to which the recommendations
actually have engaged policy makers.
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